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In Michotte’s launching displays, while the launcher (object A) seems to move
autonomously, the target (object B) seems to be displaced passively. However, the
impression of A actively launching B does not persist beyond a certain distance identified
as the “radius of action” of A over B. If the target keeps moving beyond the radius of
action, it loses its passivity and seems to move autonomously. Here, we manipulated
implied friction by drawing (or not) a surface upon which A and B are traveling, and by
varying the inclination of this surface in screen- and earth-centered reference frames.
Among 72 participants (n = 52 in Experiment 1; n = 20 in Experiment 2), we show that
both physical embodiment of the event (looking straight ahead at a screen displaying the
event on a vertical plane vs. looking downwards at the event displayed on a horizontal
plane) and contextual information (objects moving along a depicted surface or in isolation)
affect interpretation of the event and modulate the radius of action of the launcher. Using
classical mechanics equations, we show that representational consistency of friction from
radius of action responses emphasizes the embodied nature of frictional force in our
cognitive architecture.
Keywords: causality, friction, embodied cognition, event perception, prediction
Introduction
“It was a slippery, slippery, slippery slope
I feel me slipping in and out of consciousness”
Thom Yorke (2006) Harrowdown Hill lyrics excerpt
We inhabit a world where friction is omnipresent and crucial in our everyday life actions. Con-
sider a world without friction (i.e., full of slippery surfaces): we could not walk without the fric-
tion between our shoes and the ground; neither could we hold any object (e.g., a pencil). When
walking, our foot pushes backwards on the ground and the reaction force pushes us forwards
thanks to friction. Actually, we often experience friction as a source of effort, such as when rear-
ranging the furniture in a room. There is strong evidence that actions in our world, and the
accompanying forces we experience, influence visual perception of distance and motion (Prof-
fitt, 2006), and are at the origin of our causal understanding (White, 2006, 2009). For example,
apparent distance or terrain inclination increases when wearing a heavy backpack or throwing
a heavy object (Proffitt, 2006), and because our brain predicts the sensory effects and causal
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effects of our actions we can learn to play drums or basketball,
but can hardly tickle ourselves (Blakemore et al., 2000). How-
ever, the mastery of physical forces accompanying our actions
(e.g., playing music or sport) stands in sharp contrast to our poor
explicit declarative knowledge about their underlying dynamics
(McCloskey, 1983; Hecht and Bertamini, 2000).
Perception of collision events offers a variety of paradigms
to unravel the structure of our mental representation of physi-
cal principles, e.g., perception of objects bouncing on the ground
(Twardy and Bingham, 2002); control of rhythmic ball bounc-
ing (Siegler et al., 2010), etc. Michotte (1963) and others (e.g.,
Schlottmann and Anderson, 1993; Schlottmann et al., 2006)
showed that when an object A moves toward an initially station-
ary object B, and B is set into motion when A reaches B (and in
turn A becomes stationary), the impression of A actively launch-
ing B does not persist beyond a certain distance identified as the
“radius of action” of A over B (Yela, 1954; Boyle, 1961). While
the launcher (object A) seems to move autonomously, the tar-
get (object B) seems to be displaced passively. This distinction is
reminiscent of Newton’s definition of force as both an action (vis
impressa or impressed force) and also as a property of motion (vis
inertiae or force of inertia). If the target keeps moving beyond
the radius of action, it loses its passivity (vis inertia) and seems
to move autonomously (vis impressa). Our contention is that
measurement of the radius of action (RA) provides insight into
the perceived kinetic properties of the event (Sinico and Parovel,
2002).
The notion that our understanding of dynamics stems from
our experiences of acting on objects has been argued to offer a
unifying account of visual impressions of forces, imagery impli-
cated in the simulation of dynamic events, and explicit judgments
about forces (White, 2009, 2011). This view assigns a unique role
to proprioception and mechanoreceptors in the way forces are
perceived and representationally construed. In contrast to claims
of a direct perception of causality (Michotte, 1963), or of a direct
specification of dynamics by kinematics (Runeson and Frykholm,
1983), it stipulates that visual impressions of force arise through
the coupling of visual input with a knowledge base of embod-
ied dynamics (White, 2006, 2009, 2012c,d). Distinctions between
force and resistance, active and passive, or cause and effect, which
do not form part of mechanics (standing in violation of its third
law), become thereby a part of our understanding of mechan-
ical interactions, and give rise to visual impressions of causal-
ity (White, 2006). One entailed consequence is that haptically
embodied representations do not presume an isomorphism with
physical invariants—e.g., kinematic geometry (Shepard, 1984,
2001), spatio-temporal coherence (Freyd, 1987, 1993), Newto-
nian principles (Sanborn et al., 2013). While they correspond to a
form of internalization, they may as well be described as an exter-
nalization of body dynamics (Hecht, 2001), with the consequence
that both their internal and external consistency remain in every
case a matter for inquiry (Hecht and Bertamini, 2000; White,
2012b). Evidence exists that which forces come into awareness,
and how they are interpreted, depends on mental simulations
driven by our embodied knowledge of dynamics: discrepancy
from predictions (in a forward model of action) may thus bring
into awareness a force otherwise unnoticed (White, 2009, 2012a).
Michotte’s launching display is suggestive of an elastic col-
lision (e.g., between steel or pool balls) where the momentum
(and kinetic energy) of the launcher is entirely transferred to the
target and the target would keep traveling at the same veloc-
ity as the launcher just before contact, onto a surface without
friction. However, both the concept of RA and the fact that the
causal impression is increased when the target moves at a reduced
velocity relative to the launcher (Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann
and Anderson, 1993), suggest that implied friction is in the eye
of the beholder. In the present study, we manipulated implied
friction by drawing (or not) a surface onto which the launcher
and the target are traveling (which is usually not the case in
causal displays), and by varying the inclination of this surface
in a screen-centered (horizontal or diagonal) and earth-centered
(vertical or horizontal screen) frame of reference. We expected
that the radius of action would vary with inclination of the drawn
surface when objects are displayed on a vertical screen but not
for a horizontal screen (seen from above). More precisely, due
to implied gravity (Hubbard, 1990, 1997; Bertamini, 1993), RA
would be greater for objects moving downwards (than upwards)
onto an (screen-centered) inclined surface displayed on a verti-
cal (earth-centered) screen. In contrast, when the animations are
displayed on a horizontally-oriented screen, no effect of incli-
nation is expected. Finally, we quantified the representational
friction coefficient from RA responses using classical mechanics
equations, in order to study the representational consistency of
friction in causal displays, as a first approximation toward men-
tal tribology (tribology is the science of interacting surfaces that
are in relative motion, see Ludema, 1996). Consistency in the use
of the coefficient of friction would follow if people acted accord-
ing to physics (for the same pair of contacting materials, the
coefficient of friction should remain the same across conditions).
Inconsistency in its use, meaning a significant change in its esti-
mated value across conditions, corresponds in turn to a deviation
from what is entailed by physics.
While several meanings of embodiment co-exist in the psy-
chology literature (Wilson, 2002; Shapiro, 2007; Wilson and
Golonka, 2013), we take here a view of embodied cognition as the
conjoining of two claims: that cognition is situated, on the one
hand, and that “environmental invariants” (i.e., physical regular-
ities in the world around us, such as gravity or friction) have been
internalized in our cognitive system (Hubbard, 1995b), on the
other hand. As an illustration of the first point, nobody expects
equivalent collisional kinematics for a tennis ball dropped on the
floor or rolling on the ground toward a wall: the ball will bounce
several times on the floor, with observers having been shown
capable of judging how natural the bouncing looks (Twardy and
Bingham, 2002), whereas only once on the wall. Similarly, on the
basis of our locomotor experience, we can expect moving furni-
ture uphill to be more effortful than downhill. This is because
we inhabit a world with gravity and friction that we sense with
our body. As an illustration, now, of the second point, we do
learn from experience that driving on a dry road is much less
dangerous than on a wet or icy surface where friction is reduced
and braking distance increases dramatically. On the basis of this
knowledge, we can anticipate from weather forecast news the
consequences for driving of impending poor weather conditions
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(e.g., need for reducing the speed and increasing the distance
behind the vehicle in front by given amounts, depending on the
particular route conditions and type of vehicle driven). Building
on this 2-fold view, we examine here the contention that percep-
tion of collision events in a Michotte-type launching display will
be driven by both environmental (i.e., orientation of the display
with respect to gravity) and internal (e.g., coefficient of friction in
prospective mental simulations of dynamical events) constraints
resulting from embodied cognition.
Experiment 1 (Main Experiment)
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifty-two individuals took part in this experiment (mean age =
23 years, range= 19–34 years) after providing informed consent.
They were divided in two different groups according to the exper-
imental conditions. Local ethical approval from EA 4532 ethics
committee of Université Paris-Sud was granted for this study.
Stimuli and Apparatus
In the “friction” group, the launcher and target moved on a sur-
face (thick gray line, 10 pixels wide) either horizontally, or on
a diagonal trajectory downwards or upwards, −30◦ and +30◦
in screen-centered coordinates (Motion slope condition). In the
“no friction” group, the launcher and the target motions were
the same but without any surface displayed. The distance trav-
eled by the launcher before entering in contact with the target
was always the same in each trial (300 pixels). However, this
launcher-target system could be initially positioned in three pos-
sible screen-centered coordinates (A, B, C) differing in 160 pixels
steps along the motion path. The distance from the initial posi-
tion of the launcher to the screen border in the direction of
motion could be either 660, 500, or 340 pixels in the 0◦ Motion
slope, and either 740, 580, or 420 pixels in the +30◦ and −30◦
(see sample Videos 1–7 in the Supplementary Material available
online). The movies comprised 700 frames and lasted 7 s in total,
with each frame played 10ms. The motion could be rightward
or leftward (mirror animations were used). The animations were
1024 × 768 pixels movies, and each square (launcher or target)
side was 20 pixels. Because the launching effect is perceived as
more natural with a velocity ratio of 3:1 for the launcher vs. tar-
get, respectively, (Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann and Anderson,
1993), that was also the velocity ratio we used in our displays.
The launcher moved at 330 pixels/s (during the first 90 frames)
whereas the velocity of the target was 110 pixels/s (approximately
3.3◦ of visual angle per second) after the contact.
The experiment ran on a HP Compaq nx9500 Laptop (17′′
LCD screen) using ERTS-VIPL, a software package for pro-
gramming psychology experiments (http://www.berisoft.com/).
Depending on the Motion plane condition, participants faced
either a vertical screen or a screen placed horizontally onto a
table surface, from approximately 57 cm (see Figure 1). In con-
trast to Motion slope defined in a screen-centered (or viewer-
centered) reference frame (referring to the configuration within
the display), Motion plane is defined in an earth-centered frame
of reference (referring to the orientation of the screen).
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the vertical (left) and horizontal (right) Motion
plane conditions, for objects traveling onto a +30◦ slope surface.
Procedure
In each movie, the launcher moved toward the target at constant
velocity until it “collided” with the target. When the launcher
reached the target, it stopped abruptly, and the target started to
move in the same direction at reduced constant velocity (1/3
launcher velocity) until leaving the screen. It has been previ-
ously shown that such displays lead to induce strong launch-
ing impressions (Schlottmann et al., 2006) and that the motion
of the launched object systematically appears passive (Parovel
and Casco, 2006). While we did not ask participants to rate the
strength of the perceived physical causality, we note that all par-
ticipants during an exit debriefing mentioned having perceived
the target to be launched.
After the target disappeared, a mouse cursor (in the form
of a plus sign) was displayed in the center of the screen. Par-
ticipants were required to place the mouse cursor over where
the target square had been located when its motion was per-
ceived to become “autonomous.” Participants were instructed
that “autonomous” meant that the motion of the launched object
was no longer passive, and were explicitly asked tomatch the cen-
ter of the mouse cursor with the center of the target square. Note
that the launcher was always displayed onto the screen until par-
ticipants responded. The movie duration was the same whatever
theMotion slope condition: 7 s. Therefore, although the distance
from the ending screen border was 80 pixels shorter for the 0◦
condition as compared to the diagonal trajectories, the mouse
cursor appeared always 6.1 s after the target started to move.
Results and Discussion
Statistical Analyses of Behavioral Data
Repeated-measures ANOVAs on RA (in pixels) were conducted
with Implied friction (friction vs. no-friction) as a between-
subject factor, and with Motion plane (earth-centered: horizon-
tal vs. vertical) and Motion slope (screen-centered: −30◦ vs. 0◦
vs. +30◦) as within-subjects factors. Motion direction (whether
leftward or rightward) as well as objects’ Initial position (A, B,
or C) were not considered in the statistical analyses. ANOVA, η2p
and Scheffé post-hoc tests were computed using SPSS 16.0 and
Statistica 7, and the significance threshold was set to α = 0.05
unless otherwise specified. Means are reported together with 95%
Confidence Intervals (see Table 1).
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of behavioral data.
Implied
friction
Motion
slope
Radius of action (pixels) Orthogonal displacement
(pixels)
Motion plane
(earth-centered)
Motion plane
(earth-centered)
Vertical Horizontal Vertical Horizontal
Friction +30◦ 139 (±31) 167 (±29) −0.8 (±0.8) −0.7 (±1.0)
0◦ 177 (±30) 173 (±26) −1.0 (±0.6) −1.5 (±0.8)
−30◦ 240 (±51) 192 (±34) −0.1 (±1.2) −0.8 (±1.1)
No-friction +30◦ 225 (±43) 221 (±36) 0.4 (±2.5) −1.2 (±1.6)
0◦ 232 (±36) 224 (±30) −1.5 (±0.8) −1.0 (±0.6)
−30◦ 253 (±43) 238 (±36) −0.3 (±2.1) −0.5 (±1.8)
NB. Mean RA and O-displacement as a function of each condition (±95% CI).
First, the ANOVA showed a significant Implied friction effect
with shorter RA in the condition of friction (M = 181± 27) than
in the condition without friction (M = 232± 34), F(1, 50) = 5.67,
p = 0.021, η2p = 0.10. The effect of Implied friction on RA varied
with Motion slope, F(2, 100) = 3.90, p = 0.023, η
2
p = 0.07, but
not withMotion plane, F(1, 50) < 1. However, there was aMotion
slope × Motion plane × Implied friction interaction, F(2, 100) =
7.40, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.13. In order to examine the latter inter-
action separate ANOVAs were conducted for each Motion plane
or Implied friction condition.
Separate ANOVAs for each Motion plane showed that the
Motion slope × Implied friction interaction was significant in the
vertical Motion plane, F(2, 100) = 6.84, p = 0.002, η
2
p = 0.12,
but not for the horizontal Motion plane, F(2,100) < 1. More-
over, post-hoc analyses confirmed that RA did not differ signif-
icantly between each cell of the Motion slope × Implied friction
interaction for the horizontal Motion plane condition. In con-
trast, although RA did not differ significantly between the lev-
els of Motion slope in the vertical Motion plane condition for
the no-friction group, it presented differences in the friction
group. More precisely, the RA for +30◦ was marginally (p =
0.065) smaller than for 0◦, but significantly smaller than for−30◦
(p < 0.00001); and RA for 0◦ and −30◦ differed significantly
(p < 0.000001). The patterns of means are available from both
Figure 2 as well as Table 1.
Moreover, separate ANOVAs for each Implied friction group
showed that the Motion slope × Motion plane interaction was
significant for the friction group, F(2, 50) = 13.51, p < 0.0001,
η2p = 0.35, but not for the no-friction group, F(2,50) < 1. Post-
hoc analyses for the no-friction group confirmed that RA did
not differ significantly between each cell of the Motion slope ×
Motion plane interaction. In contrast, for the friction group,
RA varied with Motion slope in the vertical Motion plane (RA
for −30◦ was greater than for 0◦, p < 0.00001, and for +30◦,
p < 0.00001), but not in the horizontal Motion plane. These
differences in RA depending on Implied friction are visible in
Figure 2 illustrating the 95% confidence interval ellipses (com-
puted using the student’s t distribution) around mean response
for each cell ofMotion slope ×Motion plane. The 0,0 coordinate
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the 95% confidence interval ellipses around
the mean position where participants felt the target movement started
to be autonomous among each Implied friction group, for each
condition of the Motion slope × Motion plane interaction. The 0,0
coordinate in the left-hand y-axis on each panel reflects the initial location of
the target (i.e., its location at the time it is contacted by the launcher). The
dashed lines (not visible in the stimulus) illustrate the direction traveled by the
target.
in the left-hand y-axis on each panel refers to the initial location
of the target (i.e., its location at the time it is contacted by the
launcher).
Finally, in order to control that the RA did not vary due
to spatial memory displacement away from the target trajectory
(Hubbard, 1997), especially in the no-friction group where the
motion surface was not displayed, we computed the orthogo-
nal distance between participants’ response and the target tra-
jectory (“trajectory” meaning the path of motion of the target
center). Orthogonal distance is a measure of deviation from
the target path combining the x and y distances
(√
(x2 + y2)
)
between the point indicated by the participant and the point
in the true path of motion along a line passing by the cen-
ter of the target and intersecting the true trajectory at an angle
of 90◦. A measure of positive or negative O-displacement was
then associated to this distance, depending on whether the indi-
cated point was above or below the path of motion in screen-
centered coordinates, respectively (for the original distinction
between M- and O-displacements, see Hubbard, 1995a). Table 1
shows negligible mean O-displacements (within the range of
target’s height), and the ANOVA showed neither main effects
of the experimental factors nor interactions on O-displacement
values, which suggests that variations of RA are not related
to spatial memory displacement orthogonal to the target
trajectory.
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Physical Modeling of Friction from Radius of
Action Responses: Friction Coefficients
Computation
The friction coefficient µ is a dimensionless scalar value which
describes the ratio of the force of friction between two bodies
and the force pressing them together. The coefficient of friction
depends on the materials used; for example, ice on steel has a low
coefficient of friction, while rubber on pavement has a high coef-
ficient of friction. Coefficients of friction range from near zero
to greater than one. A friction coefficient µ = 1 means that the
force needed to move the object is equal to its weight, <1 that it
is less than its weight, and>1 that it is larger than its weight. For
example, under good conditions, a tire on concrete may have a
coefficient of friction of 1.5 (Ludema, 1996). In order to study the
representational consistency of friction in our causal displays, we
computed the (representational) friction coefficient from radius
of action responses using classical mechanics equations.
The subjective value of friction coefficient µ for the target was
computed with the equations below under the assumption that
the target will decelerate post-collision due to friction, with the
following parameters: object mass m; gravity acceleration g is a
constant (9.81ms−2); target’s deceleration dec (<0) after colli-
sion as inferred from participant’s response (see below); and the
slope angle 2. Note that actually µ does not depend on m. This
is becausem appears as a factor in both terms of the fraction and
therefore can be canceled off, and the fraction simplified.
µ =
−m.dec−m.g. sin2
m.g. cos2
=
−dec
g. cos2
− tan2 (1)
To calculate the forces on an object placed on an inclined plane
(with slope angle θ), one must consider the three forces acting
on it (air resistance is neglected for the sake of simplicity), as
illustrated in Figure 3:
1. The force EWdue to gravity (the object’s weight “mg,” acting
vertically downwards)
2. The normal force ( EN) exerted on the body by the ground sur-
face, perpendicular to the surface, in reaction to EWexerted on
the ground and
3. The frictional force (Ef ) acting parallel to the ground sur-
face, always exerted in a direction that opposes movement
(for kinetic friction) or potential movement (for static fric-
tion) between the two surfaces. When pushing an object, as
long as the object is not moving, the magnitude of the force
of static friction equals that of the applied force. When this
force exceeds the magnitude of the force of kinetic friction, the
object is put into motion (it accelerates).
We assumed that the position indicated by participants reflects
the moment (time 1t) when they detected a difference 1V
between the predicted (on the basis of a representational fric-
tion coefficient and an analogy to the physics of friction) vs. per-
ceived velocity (taken to be approached by the actual velocity)
of the target, as indicated in the instructions: “the movement of
the target seems to be autonomous.” 1t was inferred from par-
ticipant’s response (mouse click on XY screen coordinates: Xobs,
Yobs) with Equation (2) where Vobs stands for the actual target’s
velocity on the screen (110 pixels per second).
1t =
√
(Xobs2 + Yobs2)
Vobs
(2)
Because literature indicates that our visual system detects a
change in velocity when greater than 25% of actual velocity (e.g.,
Calderone and Kaiser, 1989; Babler and Dannemiller, 1993), we
assume that participants detected a change in target velocity 1V
when it reached a threshold value expressed as a percentage of
actual target velocity Vobs. Thus, Equation (3) expresses1V as a
function of a coefficient k, with k = 0.25. Furthermore, in order
to express 1V in meters per second, the self-to-scene subjective
distance Dscene (i.e., subjective distance to the objects, which has
to be estimated from participants’ responses) and self-to-screen
distance (DScreen = 0.57m) had to be taken into account:
1V = k.Vobs×
DScene
DScreen
(3)
This stems from the circumstance that the moving square can
either be perceived as the motion of an object on the screen plane
or as the projection of a distant moving object on that plane; in
the two cases, the visual angle is the same. Since the physicsmodel
and calculations of µ require to express the kinematics in physi-
cal units (m, m/s, m/s2), this self-to-scene distance factor had to
be factored in the model and computations.
Equation (4) provides the predicted target’s subjective decel-
eration as a negative variation of the predicted target velocity over
time.
dec = −
1V
1t
= −
k.Vobs
1t
×
DScene
DScreen
(4)
Vertical plane (earth-centered) condition with implied friction
for objects traveling on a horizontal surface (2 = 0◦) served as a
theoretical reference condition. Setting µ = 1 for this condition
allowed us to examine the variation of µ in the other conditions,
in proportion to this 0◦ reference condition. In this reference
condition, with µ = 1, Eq. 1 yields dec = –g. In order to com-
pute µ for the other conditions using Equation (4) and (1), we
first computed the average subjective Dscene-value for the refer-
ence condition, using Equation (5) derived from Equation (4).
DScene = g.DScreen ×
1t
k.Vobs
(5)
In brief, the strategy of our approach consisted in using a behav-
ioral measure of RA, via a set of classical mechanics equations and
some identified reasonable assumptions, to compute the repre-
sentational equivalent of a “friction coefficient.” The key assump-
tion in the process is that, in order to comply with the instructions
to locate where the target motion became autonomous, partici-
pants rely on the detection of a discrepancy between a predicted
diminished velocity of the target, reflecting an expected decel-
eration due to friction, and the actual observed velocity (1V).
The deceleration expected by participants was then derived from
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FIGURE 3 | Illustration of the forces concomitant to a rightward motion.
the ratio between 1V and the time when they detected this dif-
ference (as inferred from RA responses). From this deceleration
value, a representational friction coefficient µ was computed
using Equation 1. After setting the theoretical reference value
to µ = 1 in the vertical Motion plane condition for objects
traveling along a 0◦ Motion slope visible surface (friction group),
we proceeded to compare the µ values of the other conditions to
this reference value after Bonferroni correction (α = 0.05/11).
Results, illustrated in Figure 4, show similar values of the
representational friction coefficients in the horizontal Motion
plane for each Implied friction group. In contrast, in the ver-
tical Motion plane, the friction coefficient varied with Motion
Slope and Implied Friction conditions. The variation of the rep-
resentational friction with slope for the no-friction group results
from the invariance of RA acrossMotion slope conditions, which
would be unexpected from the standpoint of physics. As a con-
sequence, if friction was to explain this invariance, the friction
coefficient would have to be smaller for ascending slopes and
greater for descending slopes, as compared to 0◦. Such represen-
tational inconsistency of friction seems unreasonable and sug-
gests rather that participants of the no-friction group reasoned
about object motion independently of environmental invariants,
such as gravity or friction. Finally, the RA estimate of the friction
group in the verticalMotion plane condition is in agreement with
physics for the ascending slope, whereas it is not for the descend-
ing slope where the representational friction is greater than the
reference value, t(25) = 10.93, p < 0.05/11, Cohen’s d = 2.14
(see Figure 4).
Friction from the ground-object contact acts as a brake that
dissipates kinetic energy from the moving objects into thermal
energy. Interactive Physics 2000©allowed us to simulate this dis-
sipation along time for the launcher and the target, for equivalent
launcher velocity just before contact, 1 kg objects and µ = 1 (see
Videos 8–10 in the Supplementary Material available online).
Remember that, as mentioned above, µ does not depend on m.
However, the mass of each object had to be specified in order for
the software to perform the simulations. Contrary to Michotte’s
displays, simulated motion is that of an inelastic collision (some
of the initial kinetic energy is lost while converted into internal
excitation, heat, or eventually into deformation) with decreasing
FIGURE 4 | Computed friction coefficients (µ) for each condition after
setting the theoretical reference value to µ = 1 in the vertical Motion
plane condition for objects traveling along a 0◦ Motion slope visible
surface. Stars indicate significant departure from the theoretical value after
Bonferroni correction.
object velocity due to friction. Both the launcher and the target
continue to move after collision to a different extent depending
on motion slope. Actually, the traveled distance after collision
varies as a function ofMotion slopewith a pattern resembling that
of the RA estimates of the friction group in the vertical Motion
Plane condition. However, if RA reflects expected stopping point,
the estimate for the descending slope is smaller than expected
according to physics (mean RA for −30◦ is about 1.36 greater
than for 0◦, whereas Interactive Physics 2000©simulations indi-
cate a target traveled distance about 2.82 greater for −30◦ as
compared to 0◦), suggesting an increase in the representational
friction as compared to the 0◦ reference condition. In other
words, the observed RA on the−30◦ condition would have to be
larger to agree with the physical model (with an invariant friction
coefficient µ = 1). For explaining through friction the smaller
ratio of the observed RA in the −30◦ with respect to 0◦ condi-
tions, the physical model would imply an increase in the “friction
coefficient.”
In order to test if the increased representational friction
for −30◦ might result from a low-level effect due to the prox-
imity of the screen that would impose a limit to RA responses
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we performed an additional ANOVA on RA while introducing
Initial position (A, B, or C) as a supplementary within-subject
factor. Results indicated that although there was a main effect
of Initial position on RA (MA = 219 ± 26; MB = 206 ± 23;
MC = 195± 20), F(2, 100) = 19.05, p < 0.000001, η
2
p = 0.28, this
factor did not interact with any of the other three factors. There-
fore, the initial target distance to the screen border had an overall
effect not specific to descending slopes. The observed decrease
of RA with initial distance of the target from the screen bor-
der was negligible (range = 13–19 pixels, i.e., smaller than the
target size) when initial distance to the screen border decreased
by 160 pixels steps between Initial position A and B or B and
C. Finally, although we did not formulate any hypothesis about
an effect ofMotion direction (whether leftward or rightward), we
ran an ANOVA including both Initial position andMotion direc-
tion in addition to previous factors, as a further control to make
sure that counterbalancing factors did not matter. As it turned
out, Motion direction was not significant, F(1, 50) = 2.99, n.s.,
η2p = 0.06, nor didMotion direction interact with Initial position,
F(2, 100) = 1.83, n.s., η
2
p = 0.04. Moreover, regarding theMotion
slope × Motion plane × Implied friction interaction of interest,
neitherMotion direction, Initial position, nor both taken together
interacted with it, Fs(2,100) < 1.
Experiment 2 (Control Experiment)
The validity of our friction coefficient computations rests on
the assumption that RA provides a measure of the time when
observers detected a difference between the predicted vs. actual
behavior of the target. In order to ascertain this hypothesis we
performed a control experiment where participants indicated this
time point on-line vs. a posteriori.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty individuals took part in this experiment (mean age = 20
years, range = 18–27 years) after providing informed consent.
None of them had participated in Experiment 1. Local ethical
approval from EA 4532 ethics committee of Université Paris-Sud
was granted for this study.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Stimuli and Apparatus were similar to those used for the friction
group in the Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants indicated the position/moment from which they felt
that “the target movement started to be autonomous” either a
posteriori with the mouse cursor (as in the Main Experiment) or
on-line by pressing the space bar. These Response type conditions
were performed in two separate counterbalanced blocks. More-
over, participants were tested only in the vertical Motion plane
with friction.
Results and Discussion
Time data (in ms) of the on-line response condition were con-
verted into RA values (in pixels). A simple regression was per-
formed in order to test if spatial RA of a posteriori responses
FIGURE 5 | On-line Radius of Action as a function of A posteriori
Radius of Action, for each participant; each point corresponds to
individual mean data for a given level of the Motion Slope condition
(three data points per participant).
predicted temporal RA of on-line responses (see Figure 5). The
linear regression model (Y = 12.54 + 0.81X) predicted signifi-
cantly the data with a significant slope [β = 0.84, t(58) = 12.09,
p < 0.000001] and an intercept not different from zero [t(58) =
0.88, n.s.]. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that
spatial RA provides a good approximation for the time point
when observers detected a difference between the predicted vs.
actual behavior of the target.
Furthermore, in order to see whether results in Experiment 1
replicate in the vertical plane, friction condition, we computed
representational friction coefficients after setting the theoretical
reference value to µ = 1 in the vertical Motion plane condition
for objects traveling along a 0◦ Motion slope visible surface. For
each Response type condition, the resulting mean µ-values for
the +30◦ and −30◦ Motion slope conditions were compared to
this reference value after Bonferroni correction. In addition to
these four comparisons we also tested if the µ-values for +30◦
and −30◦ differed between Response type conditions. Therefore,
the Type I error threshold was set to α = 0.05/6. Results, illus-
trated in Figure 6, indicated that representational friction coef-
ficients differed from the reference only for −30◦ for both the
on-line [µ = 1.35, t(19) = 6.53, p < 0.05/6, Cohen’s d = 1.46]
and a posteriori responses [µ = 1.32, t(19) = 6.34, p < 0.05/6,
d = 1.42], thus replicating the findings of Experiment 1. In addi-
tion, mean µ-values did not differ between Response type con-
ditions neither for the +30◦ motion slope [t(19) = 0.88, n.s.,
d = 0.20], nor for the –30◦ [t(19) = 0.91, n.s., d = 0.20]
conditions.
Taken altogether, the empirical elements available (regression
model and friction coefficients) speak in favor of the soundness
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FIGURE 6 | Computed friction coefficients (µ) for each Response type
condition (on-line vs. a posteriori) and Motion slope condition in the
vertical Motion plane with implied friction. The theoretical reference value
was set to µ = 1 for objects traveling along a 0◦ Motion slope visible surface.
Stars indicate significant departure from the theoretical value after Bonferroni
correction.
of using the spatial measure of RA as a reasonable approximation
to the moment when the participants detect a difference between
predicted and observed velocity, and thus as a means for the
estimation of “friction coefficients.”
General Discussion
In spite of variations in surface layout or in friction in the world
we inhabit, we seldom fall or slip in our adult lifetime, espe-
cially when standing or walking on (earth-centered) horizontal
surfaces. However, when considering potentially slippery slopes
for unfamiliar surfaces, we tend to rely more on visual than tac-
tile information regarding friction (Joh et al., 2007). As a con-
sequence, we explicitly overestimate our locomotor or standing
ability on low-friction surface (e.g., vinyl), and underestimate our
ability on high-friction surfaces (e.g., rubber). In contrast, since
the brain can predict the consequences of the forces we generate
(e.g., to adjust grip force when striking a ketchup bottle to prevent
it from slipping (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001) and experience
(e.g., when returning a tennis ball), relations among forces appear
to be internalized to some extent. Here, we used computer-
generated displays based on Michotte’s causal displays to inves-
tigate to what extent mental representations of collision events
preserve similarity relations with properties of physical invariants
(viz., second-order isomorphism, (Shepard and Chipman, 1970).
For this purpose, we quantified the representational friction coef-
ficient from radius of action (RA) responses to Michotte’s causal
displays using classical mechanics equations, in order to identify
how representational consistency of frictional force in collision
events is modulated by contextual information.
We reasoned that if physical invariants are embodied in the
cognitive architecture, implied friction will affect RA with a
pattern depending on the orientation of the display with respect
to environmental constraints such as gravity direction. Because
friction is proportional to the magnitude of the normal force
acting on the object, which depends on the orientation of the sup-
port surface with respect to gravity, if cognition is situated then
implied friction should be instantiated differently as a function
of (viewer-centered) motion slope and (earth-centered) motion
plane. Literature provides several examples where embodiment
of gravity via proprioception influences visual perception and
our prediction of motion: whatever observer’s orientation with
respect to gravity, tunnel turns are perceived more bent when the
end is pointing in the direction of gravity (Vidal et al., 2006);
virtual objects moving at constant velocity in the direction of
gravity induce earlier interceptive responses (Senot et al., 2005)
and greater spatial memory displacement (Nagai et al., 2002) than
when moving in the direction opposite to gravity.
First, we found that when the support surface on which both
launcher and target are traveling is not explicitly displayed, RA
did not vary as a function of motion slope nor motion plane,
as if the representational friction (resistive force) was constant
across orientations. Moreover, participants were very consistent
in their response as indicated by the insignificant orthogonal
deviations from the target path. At first glance, this might suggest
that when the support surface is not part of contextual infor-
mation, participants would reason about object motion indepen-
dently of environmental invariants, just as young infants believe
that self-propelled objects require no external support to move
in midair (Luo et al., 2009). However, on the one hand, invari-
ance of RA across motion slope in the horizontal motion plane
might be compatible with implied physics, since the gravity direc-
tion is constant across motion slope, which thus suggests some
internal consistency with respect to the earth-centered referen-
tial. On the other hand, the similar invariance found for the
vertical motion plane appears more consistent with an impetus
heuristics (Kozhevnikov and Hegarty, 2001). In the more influ-
ential versions of the impetus theory, the imparted impetus that
sets a body in motion in a given direction has to fully dissipate
or to be strongly diminished for gravity to exert an effect and
eventually prevail. This framework would thus lead to predict
invariance of the RA across motion slope as long as dissipation
of the imparted impetus didn’t reach the required point for grav-
ity to be factored in. In the vertical motion plane, such invariance
is definitely inconsistent with motion along an invisible surface
with a constant friction coefficient across motion slope.
When both launcher and target are traveling in sequence along
a path displayed in the visual scene, the effect of this implied sur-
face varies as a function of motion plane. RA is invariant across
motion slope when motion plane is horizontal; however, mean
RA is smaller by a constant amount (about 2 times an object
size) than when no implied surface is displayed. This suggests
that object’s motion was interpreted as an instance of wall hug-
ging, resulting in an expected overall reduction of the target’s
velocity by virtue of friction, while the computed friction coef-
ficient still did not differ from the reference condition (objects
moving along a horizontal slope surface in the vertical motion
plane). As for objects’ motion in the vertical plane, RA varied
as a function of motion slope in a way roughly consistent with
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the effect of representational friction being modulated by gravity,
i.e., smaller RA for ascending slopes and greater RA for descend-
ing slopes (as compared to 0◦). However, although there was
internal consistency between the representational friction coeffi-
cients for ascending and horizontal slopes, the computed friction
coefficient for descending motion was 1.5 greater than for the
two other conditions. One possible conjecture consistent with
this result is that the increased friction coefficient for descending
targets would reflect an embodied braking of the target. Simi-
lar to experimental participants who project their intention to
throw objects and mistakenly believe that objects would initially
continue to accelerate shortly after leaving their hand (Hecht
and Bertamini, 2000), our participants might have embodied the
target to simulate braking in order to rapidly reach the decelera-
tion required to stop the target safely (Fajen, 2005). This inter-
pretation is consistent with authors arguing that our actions
in the world are the origin of our visual impressions of force
between interacting objects (White, 2009), and that environmen-
tal constraints are perceptually scaled to the economy of action
(Proffitt, 2006). For example, when we descend hills it requires
earlier/greater braking to counteract the gravity pull. Similarly,
walking on a slippery floor is more likely to lead to falls and
consequently needs to be carefully handled.
Recognition of surface slipperiness has been embodied in
our perceptual system through experience. Although visual and
auditory cues to slipperiness are less informative than sliding
resistance from tactile cues (Cohen and Cohen, 1994), subjec-
tive slipperiness ratings made from available visual cues (such
as reflectiveness and texture) are consistent with actual coeffi-
cients of friction of surfaces (Lesch et al., 2008). This remains
true even among vision-impaired elderly persons, though to a
lesser extent (Hsu, 2011). Our brain in-builts bisensory (hap-
tics and vision) texture-selectivity regions located in the medial
occipital (Stilla and Sathian, 2008) and medial occipitotemporal
(Podrebarac et al., 2014) cortices. This suggests literally that we
may in some sort “feel” (haptically-like) sliding resistance from
the textures we see (White, 2012b). Visual features of a surface,
such as the thick gray line on/aside which the launcher and target
moved in our experiment (see Figure 1), may be used to elabo-
rate a mental image of its roughness (Newman et al., 2005) and
in turn predict the forces encountered by the launched object in a
Michotte’s display. Such visuo-haptic mental simulation process
would modulate the radius of action of a launcher over a target.
Our data suggested that the representational friction affects
the radius of action of a launcher over a target in Michotte-
type displays, with a pattern reflecting the embodiment of phys-
ical invariants in the cognitive architecture. These findings run
counter Michotte’s statement, directed against the projective
interpretation of visual events, that only the visual structure of the
event can cause a fusion between kinaesthetic and visual impres-
sions (Michotte, 1941, p. 123–124). Here, we show that both
physical embodiment of the event (looking at a vertical vs. hor-
izontal plane, cf. Figure 1) and contextual information (objects
moving along a surface) affect interpretation of the event and
modulate the radius of action of the launcher. Literature also
provides similar evidence of embodied friction. Objects sliding
along a surface exhibit less forward displacement in memory
(representational momentum) than when moving in isolation
(Hubbard, 1998), due to the representational friction (Hubbard,
1995a); representational momentum is even more reduced when
the object moves between two surfaces. In addition to replicat-
ing the general findings of greater representational friction for
objects sliding along a surface than when moving in isolation, we
provide quantitative estimates of representational friction coef-
ficients, in order to test the consistency of their embodiment
(internalization through experience) in our cognitive architec-
ture. Moreover, we provide evidence that mental simulation of
resistive force is situated, as implied friction varied with orien-
tation of the display with respect to gravity in an earth-centered
rather than eye-centered frame reference frame. Our results go
along the lines of a series of experiments by Senot and colleagues
(Senot et al., 2005, 2012; Le Seac’h et al., 2010) showing ear-
lier interceptive responses for catching a virtual ball falling from
“above” (as compared to approaching from “below”) in align-
ment with respect to the gravity pull, but not when looking to
the same scene (with visual “up” and “down”) orthogonally to
gravity (Senot et al., 2005). In our study, body posture varied
while looking down to a horizontal display versus straight ahead
to a vertical display. However, with experiments run on Earth
or weightlessness (parabolic flights), Senot et al. showed that the
only important parameter is the orientation of the moving object
with respect to the gravity pull (sensed by our otolith receptors),
and not the body posture (Le Seac’h et al., 2010; Senot et al., 2012).
Similarly, the up/down asymmetry in estimating the pitch angle
of a virtual corridor traveled on Earth reduces dramatically while
free-floating in weightlessness (International Space Station). This
asymmetry may be restored by attaching astronauts with belts
and foot straps providing haptic inputs that help the brain recon-
struct the missing gravitational cues (De Saedeleer et al., 2013). In
summary, sensing gravity’s pull (by the otoliths or contact forces)
appears as the main parameter for cognition to be situated and,
in our case, simulating the forces exerted on a launched target
moving along a surface.
The embodiment of both friction and gravity forces in our
cognitive architecture may well be more pervasive than wemay at
first think. Embodied theories of conceptual representation pro-
pose that the human sensorimotor system may serve to embody
abstract ideas and metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Gallese
and Lakoff, 2005). The gravity pull is “tightly linked” to our con-
ception of emotion and morality. Positive words are associated
to UP whereas negative words to DOWN (Lakoff and Johnson,
1999; Lakens, 2012), and both metaphorical associations auto-
matically reactivate corresponding directional body movements
(Koch et al., 2011) and postures (Dudschig et al., 2015). Multi-
modal simulation from language may also sustain The Mind is A
Body andThinking Is Physical Functioningmetaphors (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999, p. 237) and explain why one might feel slipping in
and out of consciousness just as on a slippery slope (see intro-
ductory excerpt), or why it is difficult “to resist the force of an
argument” or “the overwhelming weight of evidence.” Similarly,
while analyzing the mechanisms of slippery slopes arguments in
the legislative-judicial domain, Volokh (2003) emphasized that
“People resist attempts to take rights away outright, but not if
the rights are eroded slowly.” In the latter metaphor, erosion
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supposedly alters coarseness of the surface, which in turn dimin-
ishes the resistive force of friction. In the present study, although
roughness of surfaces was unspecified in the displays, the coeffi-
cient of friction emerged as a parameter in themental simulations
of participants seemingly driven by their embodied knowledge of
dynamics.
Conclusion
In Michotte’s launching displays, if the target keeps moving
beyond the radius of action (RA) of the launcher (over the target),
the target loses its passivity and seems to move autonomously.
Our findings show that when both launcher and target are travel-
ing along a thick gray line displayed in the visual scene, the effect
of this implied surface on themoment when the target movement
is perceived as autonomous reveals how friction is embodied in
our cognitive system. For objects’ motion in the vertical plane, RA
varied as a function of motion slope in a way roughly consistent
with the effect of representational friction being modulated by
gravity. In contrast, when the surface on which both launcher and
target are traveling was not explicitly displayed, RA did not vary
as a function of motion slope nor motion plane, as if the repre-
sentational friction from the milieu was constant across orienta-
tions, which is more consistent in turn with an impetus heuristics
interpretation. Therefore, the possibility remains that embodied
knowledge of forces (whether exerted or resistive) gives raise to
scattered concepts or micro-theories which mediate judgments
about force (Hecht, 2001) and make up distinct branches of
expression of a bodily-based dynamics (White, 2012b,c). When
studying perceptual causality, not keeping in mind the role of
embodied dynamics and the potential heterogeneous coexistence
of resulting micro-theories in our cognitive system is what might
well turn out being a slippery slope at the end.
Supplementary Material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.
2015.00483/abstract
Video 1 | This movie illustrates a rightward 0◦ Motion slope with implied
friction from Initial position A.
Video 2 | Idem from Initial position B.
Video 3 | Ibidem from Initial position C.
Video 4 | Rightward +30◦ Motion slope with implied friction from Initial
position B.
Video 5 | Idem but for a −30◦ Motion slope.
Video 6 | Leftward +30◦ Motion slope without implied friction from Initial
position B.
Video 7 | Idem but for a rightward motion.
Video 8 | This movie shows a friction simulations from the Interactive
Physics 2000© software for the vertical Motion plane condition and +30◦
Motion slope.
Video 9 | Idem for a 0◦ Motion slope.
Video 10 | Ibidem for a −30◦ Motion slope.
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